The free-rider reproach is not justified. The momentum of the Swiss economy is not driven by exports, but by domestic demand. We do not simply profit from others' programmes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 sketches the current state of the world economy and that of Switzerland. Section 2.1 goes on to discuss the pros and cons of discretionary fiscal policy from a history of economic thought perspective. The Keynesian mainstream view of the 1950s and 1960s, which held that 'rational fiscal policy' has solved the problems of unemployment and slow economic growth, was later-on replaced by utmost scepticism against the merits of fiscal policy.
This scepticism remained dominant among economists and policymakers virtually until the crisis escalated in 2008, but was then (somewhat surprisingly) abandoned. Section 2.2 summarises the fiscal policy measures taken in Switzerland in reaction to the crisis, and section 3 analyses their effects. After the KOF macroeconometric model is described in section 3.1, sections 3.2 and 3.3 present the results of counterfactual simulations in which both the domestic and foreign stimulus measures are 'switched off'. Comparing these results with our baseline scenario (the KOF September 2009 business cycle forecast), we find that discretionary government spending has reduced the decline of Swiss GDP by some 0.5%, and that additional spending in the near future will encounter a positive multiplier of up to 1.5, provided the right measures are chosen. The highest multiplier is found for government expenditure (1.6), the lowest (0.6) for a linear reduction in income tax rates.
We hence conclude that more government spending, targeted primarily at low income households with a high marginal propensity to consume, would be an adequate, timely and targeted measure.
Last but not least, we show that the effect of the fiscal stimuli in Switzerland's major export destinations dwarfs the results of the domestic efforts, which implies that Switzerland to a considerable degree took a free ride out of the recession.
1
The US subprime mortgage crisis and its consequences
The world economy in recession
In 2008, the world economy slipped into the most severe recession since the end of World War II.
The crisis originated in the US housing market. The boom in residential construction, which had gained momentum in 2003, ebbed at the turn of the year 2005/06, quickly making way for a sharp decline. US house prices began to drop in mid-2006. The burst of the housing bubble had unexpectedly strong repercussions on the global financial system. It became apparent that US banks had generously approved mortgages for people who could not afford to service them -the so-called noincome-no-assets (NINA) or 'sub-prime' mortgages -or, more precisely, to people who could have serviced their mortgages only under the condition that house prices had kept rising. As this condition was no longer valid, foreclosure rates picked up. In an attempt to spread risk, US banks had securitised sub-prime mortgage debt and sold the resulting asset-backed securities world-wide. With the stream of mortgage interest payments ebbing, these securities -and also the second-round securities based on them -dramatically devaluated. Banks had to write down their assets to an unprecedented extent, suddenly facing severe balance sheet problems. In Of course, the financial crisis is not the whole story behind the recession. The world economy had grown at above-average rates between 2004 and 2007, and a cyclical downturn was in the offing. Also, the oil price surged from around $90 to over $140 over the first half of 2008 amidst the financial turmoil, pulling inflation rates up and dragging purchasing power out of consumers' pockets. A closer look at US industrial production and capacity utilisation for instance shows that both already dropped markedly in August 2008, i.e. before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It was the 3 coincidence of several large adverse shocks -the burst of the housing bubble in the US and a number of European countries, the financial crisis, and the oil price hike -which made this recession special in that it hit a number of important industries (construction, banking and insurance, transportation, manufacture of vehicles) at the same time.
According to currently available data, the recession began in the US at the turn of the year 2007/08. By the following quarter it had spread to the rest of the world. One salient feature of the 2008/09 recession is that it hit the whole world synchronously. Another characteristic is the collapse of industrial production and world trade after the Lehman shock. The sudden drying-up of credit markets seems to have contributed significantly to the breakdown of world trade in that it made trade credit and bank guarantees unavailable. Production on the other hand was curtailed because firms facing credit constraints aimed at converting stocks into cash instead of incurring production costs. Somewhat ironically therefore, countries relying on exports and manufacturing -especially Japan and Germany -were hit harder by the recession than countries more closely associated with the financial crisis (like the US or the UK). Table 1 summarises past GDP growth rates and projections for 2009 for the world, its major economies, and Switzerland. 
Impact of the crisis on the Swiss Economy
From 2003-2007, the Swiss economy experienced GDP growth rates far above average and at the same time without the negative side effects that usually accompany such a boom period -rising inflation rates and bottlenecks on the labour market. The increased immigration of well-trained workers from EU countries -due to the progressive easing of migration restrictions until their final abolishment in June 2007 -prevented wages from rising steeply, at the same time giving a significant impulse to residential construction, which thus held up comparatively well throughout the crisis.
Initially, Switzerland appeared to be little affected by the world-wide downswing. The losses of its two internationally active big banks (UBS and Credit Suisse) were however extraordinary. Both had to raise additional capital; and in order to rescue the UBS, the central government provided CHF 6 bill., while the Swiss National Bank was ready to take over toxic assets with a maximum face value of USD 54 bill.. Moreover, countries assuming that their taxpayers had hidden substantial fortunes as well as the capital income resulting from these behind the screens of Swiss banking secrecy laws, were no longer ready to accept the peculiar distinction made in Switzerland between 'tax evasion' and 'tax fraud'-only the latter was regarded to be a criminal offence. In March 2009
Switzerland finally declared its readiness to negotiate treaties with provisions to provide information to foreign tax offices on suspected cases of tax evasion. The factual end of banking secrecy for foreign tax evaders challenges one of the most profitable pillars of the Swiss banking sector, thus adding to its distress. Consequently, valued added of the financial sector dropped sharply already in 2008, and it is not likely that it will reach its prior heights in the foreseeable future.
Swiss exporting industries were hit by the crisis in 2008 when world-wide sales expectations plunged, but due to still quite resilient domestic demand as well as to a then still impressive contribution of transit trade to GDP growth of about 0.7 percentage points, the 2008 year-on-year GDP growth rate still reached 1.8%. However, by September 2008, it became evident that the crisis had hit Switzerland, and forecasters changed their outlooks to recession scenarios.
The drop of overall economic activity began in the middle of 2008 and continued at least until mid-2009. Quarterly GDP estimates from the Swiss Department of Economics released on November 30, 2009, indicate a return of the September quarter-on-quarter growth rate into positive territory, but as the data are provisional, we cannot yet be sure when exactly the trough will be dated once the final data are available. Be this as it may, it will take years until real GDP reaches its precrisis peak level. Even if demand for Swiss exports from abroad should pick up considerably, with capacity utilisation now at record low levels, domestic equipment investment will not reach its trough before the end of 2010. Moreover, unemployment is still rising with a peak to be expected around mid-2010, which should depress private consumption. The KOF hence forecasts a slow economic recovery for Switzerland. The pre-crisis level of GDP will not be reached until 2012, which is outside the forecast horizon of KOF's macro model. Notice that for this forecast, the domestic as well the foreign fiscal stimulus packages by Switzerland's most important trading partners that were launched or in the pipeline in September have been incorporated. We shall return to this point in section 3.
Before this, let us turn our attention to the theoretical discussion on what can be expected from discretionary fiscal policy (in section 2.1) as well as to an account of the fiscal policy measures that were implemented in Switzerland over the course of the present crisis (section 2.2). (Keynes, 1936, ch. 13) , or firms do not exert any demand for credit despite low interest rates, due to extraordinarily pessimistic expectations concerning the 'marginal efficiency of capital' (Keynes, 1936, ch. 22 ). In such situations, which later have been christened 'liquidity trap' and 'investment trap', respectively, even proponents of the Treasury View could have advocated a stimulation of the economy through fiscal policy. Nevertheless, discretionary fiscal policy counts as 'Keynesian' -and rightly so, in our view, because it was Keynes who introduced concepts like liquidity preference or the marginal efficiency of capital from which a theoretical rationale for fiscal policy could be deduced.
The initial reaction to Keynes's General Theory in the economics profession was reserved, to say the least. Most book reviewers were irritated by Keynes's departure from the then prevailing mainstream, with the most critical voice being that of Pigou (1936) (Lekachman, 1966) , carefully reconstructs the process in which Keynesian ideas -and especially the idea of securing full employment by means of fiscal policy -took hold among academic economists and policymakers in the US and Britain after the war. When reading Lekachman's book today, one cannot help but being amazed by the optimism -others might call it hubris -with which the author looks into the future, being convinced that all major economic problems could be solved by the application of fiscal policy. 4 Notably, his notion of fiscal policy has shifted away from being a last resort when all other means fail toward being a tool governments should use all of the time.
With hindsight, the post-war swing in the profession's attitude towards the effectiveness of monetary versus fiscal policy was too pronounced. From the Treasury View, which held that monetary policy was a potent instrument to promote economic stability, "(o)pinion shifted almost to the opposite extreme, that 'money doesn't matter'; that it is a passive factor which chiefly reflects the effects of other forces; and that monetary policy is of extremely limited value in promoting stability" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963: 300) . Milton Friedman, especially, set himself the task to counterattack the 'Keynesian Revolution'. Although Friedman's specific monetary rule lost its appeal relatively quickly, his general plea for basing economic policy on rules rather than discretion remained uncontroversial among mainstream economists as well as policymakers until the recent outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis. The same is true for his rejection of demand-side interventionism and the re-focus of economic theory and policy toward the supply side on the one hand and the long run on the other. In the 1970s, Friedman's arguments against discretionary fiscal policy were further strengthened by Kydland and Prescott's (1977) demonstration of the time inconsistency problem 5 as well as more generally by the dominance of New Classical macroeconomics with its pronouncedly sceptical stance on the economic wisdom of governments.
In the early 1970s, the New Classical macroeconomists radicalised Friedman's scepticism toward fiscal policy in that they disputed fiscal policy's ability to stabilise the unwanted short-term fluctuations of business activity. (Friedman, for his part, mainly had opposed the Keynesian pretension to be able to secure permanent full employment by means of fiscal policy.) At the basis of the New Classical attack on short-term stabilisation policy was the rediscovery of Muth's (1961) 'rational expectations' by Lucas (1972).
Friedman's argument that expansionary monetary policy could temporarily reduce unemployment below its 'natural' level was based on the assumption that workers form expectations adaptively, which would lead them to underestimate real wages during inflationary periods. Employers on the other hand are assumed to know that the real wage is below the level compatible with 'natural' unemployment, hence they hire workers. According to this view, the efficacy of monetary policy rests on systematic expectational errors. If the latter are ruled out -as in the concept of rational expectations -monetary policy is no longer capable of moving prices away from their expected (or equilibrium) values. As Wallace (1975, 1976) have pointed out, stabilisation policyeven by monetary means -is then impossible. Accordingly, Keynesianism was boldly pronounced 'dead' (Lucas and Sargent, 1978 ) -but, as we now know, prematurely.
Lucas mainly adhered to Friedman's analytical framework; he merely replaced adaptive expectations with rational expectations. Although monetary policy becomes ineffective, money in Lucas' theory remains significant. According to Friedman, business cycles are caused by mistaken impulses from monetary policy. Lucas adds that foreseeable monetary impulses will not have real consequences. However, monetary impulses which come as a surprise -and are hence not subject to the formation of rational expectations -will have real consequences. Lucas assumes that entrepreneurs know the prices of their own products at all times. Information on the general prices level on the other hand comes in with a time-lag. Therefore, entrepreneurs will initially misinterpret a rise in the general price level caused by a surprising monetary shock as a rise in the relative prices of their products and expand their production. Thus, surprising monetary shocks can cause up-or downswings, during which markets nevertheless remain in equilibrium, as defined by this approach (Lucas, 1975 ). Lucas thus assumes perfect markets and an inter-temporal general equilibrium. Business cycles are the result of monetary surprises in combination with incomplete information on the part of the entrepreneurs. They do not result from wage or price rigidities, which Lucas rules out.
New Classical macroeconomics dominated the academic discourse during the 1970s. In the end however, this approach may have failed because it "proved to be too successful", as Woodford (1999: 23) puts it. Given that information on the aggregate price level comes in relatively quickly, a theory of economic fluctuations that rests on monetary surprises combined with mis-interpretations of price trends cannot convincingly explain the length of real-world business cycles. At the beginning of the 1980s, macroeconomics was therefore in a state of crisis. Two quite different strands of thought emerged from here (cf. Blanchard, 2000) .
The New Keynesians reclaimed market imperfections, which had already been the 'old'
Keynesians' main justification for departures from Walrasian general equilibrium. 6 What was 'new' about New Keynesianism was that it incorporated the consensus meanwhile reached in the mainstream concerning the microeconomic standards macroeconomic models must meet (especially inter-temporal optimisation and rational expectations). The New Classical assumption of permanent market clearing was dropped, however. Wage and price rigidities -which can also be microfounded because adjustments inflict 'menu costs' on agents and are hence sub-optimal under certain circumstances -lead to departures from general equilibrium and can explain phenomena like unemployment and business fluctuations.
What dissatisfied some economists about the New Keynesian approach, however, was that the New Keynesians dropped Lucas' central assumption of permanent market clearing. Critics argued that individuals' rational actions would always result in some market equilibrium. Also, the New Keynesian assertion that 'menu costs' could be micro-founded was not met with general acclaim.
However economists who wanted to stick to permanent equilibrium confronted the challenge of explaining business cycles differently than Lucas had done. This led to the development of 'Real business cycle' (RBC) theory. In this approach, as in Lucas' theory -yet in contrast to Keynesian views -, short-term economic fluctuations are considered equilibrium phenomena, but Lucas' hy-pothesis that fluctuations are triggered by monetary surprises is dropped. Renouncing the monetarist tradition, RBC theorists declared that money was inessential: it has no -not even a short-termimpact on real magnitudes (King and Plosser, 1984) . RBC theory identifies technology shocks as the main cause for economic fluctuations (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983) .
Unlike Lucas, RBC theory claims to be able to reproduce the main empirical characteristics ('stylised facts') of real-world business cycles. For that purpose, specific algebraic expressions are allotted to the different functions describing supply and demand decisions in a general equilibrium model. The functional parameters are chosen to ensure that in reaction to a simulated supply shock, the 'calibrated' model produces data which resemble certain stylised facts. The RBC literature was quite successful in this methodological respect. It has become standard now to display the shortterm dynamics of the macro-economy in terms of a micro-founded inter-temporal general equilibrium model with specific algebraic functions and stochastic elements. RBC theory's exclusive focus on the real side of the economy, however, has triggered criticism. Also, empirical evidence is strong that monetary impulses do have an impact on real value added (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1998 ) -an impact that RBC theory in its original formulation had ruled out.
In the 1990s, a synthesis between RBC theory and New Keynesian theory held sway in the mainstream. This is now known as the 'New neo-classical synthesis' because -just like in the 'old' neoclassical synthesis -general equilibrium theory is used to model 'Keynesian' phenomena (cf. Woodford, 1999) . The methodology stems from the RBC side, but as in New Keynesian theory, wage and price rigidities are now allowed for; and wage and price formation is modelled in detail.
Unlike New Classical and RBC models, New Synthesis models do not imply permanent market clearing. Rather, the supply-side forces highlighted by RBC theory determine the course of potential output, while wage and price rigidities are responsible for departures of demand from the potential. Both supply and demand shocks can cause fluctuations of economic activity. These fluctuations are not regarded as optimal (equilibrium) reactions to the shocks, but count as disequilibrium states of affair (which is in the Keynesian tradition). Monetary policy is assigned a stabilising role. Fiscal policy, however, is still blanked out. Entering the new millennium, New Synthesis analysis using (sticky-price) Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models was the cutting edge of business cycle theory.
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis in mid-2007, however, economists and policymakers world-wide began to reconsider policy recommendations Keynes had made during the Great Depression. In the light of the consensus reached in mainstream economics over the past decades that discretionary fiscal policy is at best ineffective and probably even harmful, this reconsideration might at first sight have come as a surprise. Yet, our glance back at the debate over the pros and cons of fiscal policy is helpful for understanding why fiscal policy has come back.
The monetarist counterrevolution and its aftermath were spurred mainly by the permanent use of discretionary fiscal policy that had established itself by the mid-1960s in the US and elsewhere - Keynes had drawn the conclusion that economic agents demand money to cope with uncertainty.
This conclusion found renewed empirical support after the Lehman shock when the 'liquidity preference' of the general public and the banks alike skyrocketed. Because banks refused to lend to each other any longer, interbank markets ran dry, and central banks had to fill in as lenders of last resort. Commercial banks, on their part, hoarded the base money thus received on their accounts with the central banks instead of granting credit, whilst their customers shifted time deposits toward more liquid assets like demand deposits and cash. Monetary policy had a tough time stabilising the financial system -it was unable to contribute to a stabilisation of the real economy on top of that. In this situation, if policymakers wanted to provide relief, they could only do so by means of fiscal policy; and governments around the world decided to fall back on this instrument.
The next section describes which measures were taken in Switzerland. Section 3 analyses the impact these measures had on the Swiss economy.
Switzerland's fiscal policy measures to stabilise the economy
Switzerland is a federal state, and economic stabilisation policy is in the responsibility of the central government. So the following account focuses on the central government's activities. 8 The latter, 7 "Because, partly on reasonable and partly on instinctive grounds, our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future. ... The possession of actual money lulls our disquietude; and the premium which we require to make us part with money is the measure of the degree of our disquietude" (Keynes, 1973: 115f) . 8 Notice that this account refers to fiscal policy measures only, i.e. the huge rescue package for the UBS (see section 1.2 above) as well as the massive easing of monetary conditions by the Swiss National Bank are not elaborated on.
however, accounts for only about 40 percent of total public expenditure. As the spending behaviour of the lower levels of government (cantons, communes) can impact quite strongly on fiscal policy, some remarks on these are also necessary.
Swiss economic policy has a strong tradition of non-interventionism (economic liberalism), and the major issue in expenditure policy during the pre-crisis years has been the reduction of fiscal deficits and the debt ratios. 9 This said, the federal government reacted surprisingly quickly, albeit rather modestly, to the economic downswing. It decided to pursue a stepwise course, with each step being made dependent on the latest state of information about the economic situation and the suc- He concludes to let monetary policy along with the automatic stabilisers take care of anti-cyclical policy. Discretionary fiscal measures to fight a recession in his view have only moderate effects on aggregate demand, but they are certain to increase the public debt (p. 25 f.). This is a quite representative statement of the Swiss consensus among academic economists and politicians presently in office.
deadweight effects can be expected, as the public authorities will have difficulties to verify whether the reported investment is indeed additional to what was originally planned.
2) The duration of time for which firms can claim short-time work indemnity for their workers was extended from 12 to 18 months. This measure aims at preventing lay-offs by enticing firms to reduce work hours instead. The unemployment insurance then covers 70 to 80 percent of the shortfall in wages. Appealing as the idea is, empirical results of studies conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute show that firms using this instrument shed labour to a greater, not lesser degree than others (see Frick and Wirz, 2005) . Rather than preventing unemployment, short-time work indemnity seems to be a part of labourshedding practices in Switzerland, dampening the negative effects of rigidities on firms' liquidity.
3) The coverage of export risk insurance was extended to help avoid liquidity constraints.
A third fiscal package was decided on in September 2009, comprising CHF 300 mill. of additional expenditure in 2010. Their focus is almost entirely on the labour market, with wage-subsidies to reduce youth and long-term unemployment, and subsidies for training. The major part will only come into force if the unemployment rate exceeds 5 percent. This is, however, to be expected for the second half of 2010. In addition, the refund of energy taxes will be brought forward to 2010, which will boost private disposable income by CHF 650 mill. this year. Not explicitly part of the stimulus measures, but certainly motivated by the current state of the economy, was the decision to postpone a planned VAT increase in the range of CHF 1.1 bill. Taken together, the measures of the third stage add up to CHF 2.0 bill. (or 0.4 percent of GDP).
As was mentioned above, the cantons and communes have an important part in fiscal policy.
Traditionally, they have acted pro-cyclically with a certain time lag (see also Schaltegger, 2009 The KOF macroeconometric model subscribes to the New Keynesian modelling approach which also characterises the macro-model of the Swiss National Bank (see Stalder, 2001 ). This approach is also used in various policy-making institutions. 14 In line with other models in this tradition, the KOF model distinguishes between the long-run properties governed by aggregate supply, and the short-run dynamics that are largely demand-determined. The model is sub-divided into four main closely interrelated blocks: the supply-side block, the demand-side block, the household-income block, and the monetary block. The supply-block, determining potential output, combines the following three features: the use of a vintage production function, monopolistic competition in the goods market, and the use of business tendency survey data collected at the individual firm level reflecting tensions in the goods and labour markets. The latter feature plays an important role in determining wage-price dynamics.
In the demand-side block, the components of total output are determined allowing for short-run deviations from long-run output. Such deviations, however, trigger wage and price adjustments in the aggregate supply block that bring the model back to the long-run equilibrium path.
In the household-income block, disposable household income is determined, which is the main factor for consumption decisions of households. Finally, the monetary block of the model contains equations for exchange and interest rates. In this block, a connection to foreign (German) interest rates is established through the interest parity condition.
The KOF model is a medium-scale structural macroeconometric model comprising 317 equations, 41 of which are stochastic. The remaining equations are identities and technical relations. The stochastic equations feature long-run cointegrating relations as well as short-run dynamics.
Importantly, Switzerland is a small open economy that is de facto -notwithstanding its political reservations vis-à-vis the EU -economically integrated into the common European market. 15 With exports amounting to close to 40% of total demand (GDP plus imports), 16 it is obvious that the Swiss business cycle is to a large degree triggered by the world economy, and in particular by the economic situation in its largest trading partners in the EU: Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The KOF model clearly reflects this link, showing high sensitivity to the exogenous variables for the international economy. Accordingly, for the forecast horizon of t+2 years, the model forecasts are mainly driven by the exogenously determined time paths of the variables representing the international economy. For the latter, KOF in-house experts for the US, the EU and Asia provide quarterly estimates.
The basic structure of each block as well as the major interaction channels between these four blocks are presented in figure 1 . When presenting each block, we distinguish between the following groups of variables: first, the block-specific endogenous variables which are determined in the corresponding block; second, the endogenous variables determined elsewhere that serve as the explanatory variables in the stochastic equations of a given block; third, the exogenous variables specified outside the model. For example, for the demand-side block the endogenous variables modelled within this block are the demand-side components of GDP: private consumption, private residential and non-residential investment, inventory investment as well as exports and imports (both of goods and services). The endogenous variables supplied from the rest of the model are as follows: real disposable income, short-and long-term domestic interest rates, prices (both domestic and foreign), unemployment and private investment in equipment and machinery. In turn, the main output of the demand-side block is the total value of GDP representing a general level of domestic economic activity, which is supplied to the remaining three blocks. The third group representing exogenous variables is given by the world activity (measured as a weighted average of GDP in Europe, the USA and Japan), public expenditure, public construction and the size of the population.
The model overview presented in figure 1 allows tracking the origin of a stimulus impulse and its propagation through the model. Thus, the modelled impulses in our CH scenario originate in several blocks: the exogenous increase in public consumption as well as in public investment feed into the model through the demand-side block; the measures aimed at boosting private investment in equipment and machinery work through the supply side; similarly, the postponed introduction of the VAT impacts other model variables through domestic price equations attributed to the supplyside block; lastly, the cash injected into the economy by the refund of energy taxes boosts the disposable household income modelled in the household-income block. In our WORLD scenario, the impact of increased world economic activity mainly affects the Swiss economy via the exports channel modelled in the demand-side block. An additional effect, counterbalancing an incited surge in exports, originates in the monetary block via appreciation of the Swiss Franc relative to the currencies of its main trading partners. Naturally, movements in exchange rates will also affect imports.
It is in order to remark that macroeconomic forecasts are rarely particularly precise estimates of the final data, and the error margin is especially wide close to turning points. The KOF forecasts are no exception to this rule. However, the lion's share of revisions -with the benefit of hindsight -can usually be attributed to unexpected shocks and deviations of the realised from the assumed paths of exogenous variables. In other words, the main difficulty of model based macroeconomic forecasts is not to model the key macroeconomic relations reasonably well, but the fact that the empirical world is characterised by numerous unexpected events and developments -shocks -, so that there are severe limits to the precision that can be achieved in determining the exogenous variables. Having said this, while the point estimates of macroeconometric model based forecasts should always be taken with a grain of salt, the information conveyed by alternative scenarios, i.e. the deviation of alternative outcomes rather than their absolute magnitudes, can be referred to with considerable more confidence, as the main source of revisions is eliminated. Accordingly, while our baseline scenario -the KOF September 2009 forecast summarised above in table 2 -is presented in absolute magnitudes, our simulation results will be reported as deviations from the latter only.
The effect of measures implemented in Switzerland (CH scenario)
In this section, we refer to the KOF September 2009 forecast as the baseline scenario to assess the impacts of the fiscal stimuli in Switzerland on the Swiss economy. To this end, we re-run the model (counterfactually) without the domestic fiscal packages.
As discussed above, the discretionary fiscal measures in Switzerland cent increases due to the stimuli factored into the baseline scenario compared to the counterfactual simulation without stimuli. The GDP increase is moderate (roughly 0.5% at its peak). There is some -albeit weak -leakage via imports, whereas exports are hardly affected at all (as could be expected). Private consumption is affected similarly to GDP in timing and magnitude. In relative terms, equipment investment is the demand component that is affected most, with a peak toward the end of 2010. 17 In particular, the OECD (ibid.: 117) claims that in Switzerland, mainly because the income tax calculation is based on past income, the automatic stabilisers are amongst the weakest in the developed world (which is contrary to the praise of the domestic automatic stabilisers communicated by Swiss policy makers), so that there is more need for action than elsewhere. At the same time the OECD (ibid.: 118 ff.) finds that the scope for a proactive policy is comparatively wide, given the internationally low level of Swiss public debt, including long-term projections reflecting implicit obligations by the social security network (whereas the dominant Swiss discourse agrees with the finding of a low public debt, but wants to maintain this rather than use the resulting leeway). 2008 (4) 2009 (1) 2009 (2) 2009 (3) 2009 (4) 2010 (1) 2010 (2) 2010 (3) 2010 (4) 2011 (1) 2011 (2) 2011 (3) 2011 (4) 2012 (1) 2012 (2) 2012 (3) 2012 (4) GDP Private consumption Private equipment investment Exports Imports
Based on the macroeconometric model, we can also assess the magnitude of the multipliers associated with the different discretionary measures that fiscal policy can resort to. 18 We find that outright additional government expenditure yields the highest multiplier of roughly 1.5, and transfers to low-income households have a multiplier of 0.8. When the effects of the delay of the VAT increase are traced through 2012, the total multiplier equals 0.9. The lowest multiplier (0.6) is found for a linear reduction in income tax rates, a measure that -wisely so, as these results confirm -was not part of the recent fiscal stimuli in Switzerland, although it is quick and easy to implement and typically meets the least political resistance from opponents of a proactive fiscal policy.
The effects of measures implemented elsewhere (WORLD scenario)
In our WORLD scenario, the impact of increased world economic activity mainly affects the Swiss economy via the exports channel modelled in the demand-side block. An additional effect, counterbalancing an incited surge in exports, originates in the monetary block via an appreciation of the Swiss Franc relative to the currencies of Switzerland's main trading partners. Naturally, movements in exchange rates will also affect imports.
The main transmission channel from the international economy to Switzerland in the KOF model are the exports of goods to developed countries, where the crucial exogenous variable is "market activity in developed countries", a weighted average of real GDP projections in Switzerland's major export destinations. 19 The WORLD scenario reflects derived export demand based on the counterfactual weighted average of GDP abroad if there had been no foreign fiscal stimuli at all. We take estimates for the magnitude of foreign stimuli for the years 2008-2010 from OECD (2009a).
As the variation of the time paths of some crucial exogenous variables rests on external estimates, the degree of uncertainty is probably somewhat higher than for the CH scenario, where we have first-hand and detailed documentation on how to factor out the Swiss stimulus packages. To account for this uncertainty, we run two additional simulations where the decrease of the variable for export demand derived from the state of the international economy resulting from factoring out all foreign stimuli packages is increased by 25%, which amounts to a more optimistic view of the effect of foreign fiscal policy measures on the state of the world economy as 'strong' (WORLD-S), and a pessimistic scenario (WORLD-W), where the effect of the foreign fiscal stimuli on derived export demand is 'weak' (25% less than with the standard calculus). 20 Finally, it should be born in mind that the KOF model derives export demand from Switzerland's major export destinations from their weighted GDP, referring to the empirical estimate of the marginal propensity to import. Now, as some of the fiscal stimuli packages had elements designed to reduce the 'leakage' through the import channel, the historical propensity to import may not hold in this situation. 21 Hence, to err on the safe side, we run an additional extremely 'cautious' scenario (WORLD-C), where the variable reflecting export demand from abroad is reduced by 50% vis-à-vis the standard WORLD scenario. According to these simulations, the cumulative effects of the domestic discretionary fiscal policy measures until the end of 2011 amount to a moderate 0.95% of projected GDP for the three packages (corresponding to a multiplier close to unity), whereas the cumulative spillover from the discretionary fiscal measures abroad will have about three to six times that impact, depending on the WORLD scenario. The standard WORLD scenario yields a cumulative effect of 4.9% of Swiss GDP, the  25% scenarios 3.8% and 6.0% respectively, and even the extremely pessimistic scenario shows an effect of 2.6%. The spillover from the foreign efforts to curb the recession clearly dwarfs the joint effect from the domestic stimulus packages, and this holds even if we resort to the extremely cautious scenario where external demand for Swiss exports derived from the weighted GDP of the most important importers is only 50% of what it would be in normal times.
Last but not least, let us have a look at the outcomes of the simulations regarding the Swiss labour market. A market outcome which economic policy is universally trying to influence is (involuntary) unemployment. Unemployment does not only imply foregone income, but also massive losses of self esteem and well-being for the affected individuals and families as well as leading to 25 hysteresis that may depress potential output growth in the future. Therefore, the success in keeping the unemployment rate low is one of the most important criteria to assess the appropriateness of economic institutions and policy. In line with this, discretionary fiscal stimulus measures are routinely justified as measures to curb unemployment. As the supply side of the Swiss labour market is fairly predictable, the KOF macroeconometric model is quite reliable in tracking the evolution of unemployment due to demand shocks. According to the September 2009 forecast, the official unemployment rate in Switzerland would reach a peak of close to 5.5% early in 2011. Figure 7 shows how much the fiscal measures have helped to prevent further rises. 
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Similar to the effects on Swiss GDP, the improvement on the labour market due to the efforts of domestic fiscal policy is dwarfed by the spillover from abroad. In 2011, the WORLD-S scenario results in a 0.45 percentage points effect on the Swiss unemployment rate -more than six times the domestic 0.07 -and even the extremely cautious scenario finds a 0.19 percentage points effect, which is about three times the domestic effect. In other words, for one employee in Switzerland that will not have lost his or her job at the peak of the recession thanks to the domestic stimulus packages, there will be three to six who need to be grateful for the economic policy made abroad, where policy-makers did not hesitate to launch more sizeable measures than their Swiss colleagues. any fiscal policy packages in Switzerland's most important export destinations. We find that the spillover from the foreign efforts to curb the recession clearly dwarf the joint effect from the domestic stimulus packages, and this holds even if we resort to the extremely cautious scenario where external demand for Swiss exports derived from the weighted GDP of the most important importers is only 50% of what it would be in normal times. We hence conclude that -intentionally or not -in addition to its own (and rather limited efforts) to fight the recession with proactive fiscal policy, Switzerland took a free ride that by far exceeded the one it paid for.
To our knowledge, the "free rider" assumption, though frequently referred to in the recent debate, has not before been addressed empirically with models that allow for analysing the paths from a disequilibrium due to a pronounced demand shock back to the long-term growth path of the economy. 23 So our findings might add important evidence.
Having shown that a small open economy like Switzerland was indeed at least partly enjoying a free ride out of the recent recession makes the call for international coordination imperative. We can be sure that the next crisis will happen and if there are any lessons to be learnt from this one, the evidence of the free rider problem is one of them. Although a binding commitment to coordinated action as the first-best preparation for the next crisis cannot realistically be expected to cover all major economies, it nevertheless should be placed and remain on the agenda.
